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•employee, and should not affect rules of law between'the employer and the
type of third party involved in Miller.76
The most convincing argument for allowing recovery by the third party
is that the third party receives nothing from the workmen's compensation
-acts, yet he must sacrifice a common law right because of them. Workmen's
compensation acts give benefits to both employers and employees which
they did not have at common law in exchange for some advantages they both
had at common law." The third party indemnitee is not a Party to this
mutual sacrifice and gain; and thus he should. not lose any common law
rights because of it.77 Either the act should leave the common law rights
of the third party and employer unaffected, or some corresponding gain
should be given the third party for the loss of his common law right to in-
demnity.
The question of who to protect, the third party or the employer, involves
policy considerations which the legislature should consider. It is a very. deli-
cate balance for a court to strike, and the legislatures of the various states
should settle the indemnity controversy one way or another. Two states, Texas
and California, have enacted additions to their compensation acts, which pre-
clude indemnification by a third party unless the employer and the third
party have a contract which expressly provides for indemnification. 78 Thus,
these two states have resolved the problem, albeit not happily for many, and
it is hoped that other states will follow suit.
MICHAEL ALAN PARIS
Eminent Domain—Riparian Rights—Deprivation of Access to Naviga-
ble Waterway is Not Compensable.—Colberg v. State. 1—Plaintiffs,
Colberg, Incorporated, and Stephens Marine, Incorporated, own real property
'in the city of Stockton, California, riparian to the Upper Stockton Channel.
For more than 60 years they have operated shipyards upon this property
for the construction and repair of yachts and ocean-going vessels. The Upper
Stockton Channel runs for about 5000 feet from within the confines of the
city of Stockton to a turning basin adjoining that- city's port. Ships and other
craft now using the Upper Stockton Channel can proceed to the turning
basin and from there to a navigable tidal waterway, formed by the Stockton
Deep Water Ship Channel and the San Joaquin River. This waterway ex-
tends from the port of Stockton to San Francisco Bay and the open sea.
In order to improve its freeway system:, the State, of California proposed
to construct twin stationary freeway bridges across the Upper Stockton
Channel between plaintiffs' property and the turning basin. 2 The vertical
' 78 See American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950).
75 Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349;363-65, 63 N.W.2d 355, 364-65 (1954).
77 2 A. Larson, supra note 39, § 76.52.
78 Cal. Lab Code § 3864 (West Supp. 1967); Tex. Rev. Ciy. Stat. Ann. art. 8306,
§ 3 (1967).
1 — Cal. 2d —, 432 P.2d 3; 62 , Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949
(1968).
2 Pursuant to federal law, the state applied to the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief of Engineers for a permit to build such bridges. 33 U.S.C. § 525(b) (1964). Ap-
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clearance of these bridges is to be about 45 feet above the water line.
Colberg and Stevens brought separate actions for declaratory relief, which
actions were later consolidated. 3 Plaintiffs alleged, in substance, that after
the construction of the proposed bridges, access to their shipyards from the
San Joaquin River, the San Francisco Bay and the oceans of the world would
be substantally impaired. Colberg claimed that 81 percent of its current
business involved ships standing between 45 and 135 feet above the water
line and Stevens claimed that 35 percent of its current business involved
such ships. Both plaintiffs alleged that their properties would suffer loss and
damage because of this impairment of access resulting from the state's con-
struction of the bridges.
The trial court granted the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
It held that the diminution of the scope of the plaintiffs' access to the navi-
gable waterway would not constitute a taking or damaging of private property
for which compensation could be - required.4 The intermediate appellate court
reversed, concluding that "the project will cause compensable damage • to
plaintiffs' private properties if, in an appropriate proceeding, a court finds
substantial impairment of their respective easements - of access." 5 The state
appealed, and the Supreme Court of California, in a five to two decision,
vacated the court of appeal decision and affirmed the decision of the trial
court. HELD: Plaintiffs' right of access from their respective riparian proper-
ties to the waters of the channel, whatever its scope as against private parties,
is burdened with a servitude in favor of the state and diminution of that right
as a result of the lawful exercise of the state's power to deal with its navigable
waters does not entitle plaintiffs to compensation. 3 The dissent, however,
felt that the impairment of the plaintiffs' right of access was substantial and
peculiar, and as such, should be compensable under eminent domain com-
pensation principles and as a matter of public policy."'
For many years,. California's ambitious freeway development program
has presented the courts .of that state with claims for compensation from
property owners who have suffered property damage as a result of such pro-
jects. In recent years, these courts have developed a rather liberal compensa-
tion policy, utilizing ' eminent domain principles, with respect to those
property owners whose access to the -general system of streets has been
impaired, The Colberg case, however, represents a rather severe approach,
proval of the location and plans of the bridges was granted by the federal authorities in
February, 1964.
3 Plaintiffs have substantial investments in their shipyards. If they were required
to await construction of the bridges before commencing an action at law they would
suffer irreparable daniage resulting from interference with their business during con-
struction. A declaratory judgment establishing compensability would enable plaintiffs
to relocate their operations and minimize damages. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs
were entitled to invoke declaratory relief. — Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 7, 62 Cal. Rptr.
at 405.
4 See id.
5 Colberg, Inc. v. State, — Cal. App. 2d —, 	 55 Cal. Rptr. 159, 167 (1966):
o — Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 14-15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
7 Id. at —, 432 P.2d at 16, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
8 See, e.g., Breidert v. Southein Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1964); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
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not involving eminent domain principles, to the problem of compensating
riparian owners who suffer substantial damages as a result of impairment of
access to the general system of navigable waters. The contrast between Cali-
fornia's compensation policy with respect to land access cases on the one
hand, and water access cases on the other hand, seems unfortunate and pro-
vokes an examination of the state's "servitude" theory as applied to a riparian
owner's rights in navigable water.
There are two basic rights associated with the ownership of riparian
property. The right of access involves the right of the riparian property
owner to gain access to the navigable part of the stream adjoining his land.
This is considered to be a "private" right and clearly is of great value to the
riparian landowner.° The other right involves the free navigation of a stream
by a riparian owner once he has obtained access to it. This right is shared by
all people of a state and is, therefore, a "public" right. 10 Article I of the
California Constitution provides, in part, that "[p]rivate property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first
been made to ... the owner ...." 11 As indicated by the California Constitu-
tion, only rights of a "private" nature are compensable. 12
In the Colberg case, the intermediate appellate court found that the
right involved was that of free navigation since the impairment went to the
plaintiffs' ability freely to navigate the waterway rather than to their ability
to get from their property to the navigable part of the waterway. Though
conceding that a riparian owner shares the right freely to navigate streams
with the general public, the court held that such a right is "private" and
compensable when a public improvement devalues a particular piece of land
by'substantially impairing that right.13 The California Supreme Court, how-
ever, clearly did not consider the right of free navigation to be "private" for
any purposes and emphasized that the plaintiffs must assert the taking of a
"private" right in order to bring themselves within the protective embrace of
the state constitution. 14 The plaintiffs had argued that although their private
right of access would not be physically obstructed by the construction of the
9 United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926) ; San Fran-
cisco Say. Union v. R.G.R. Petroleum & Mining Co., 144 Cal. 134, 77 P. 823 (1904);
Marine Air Ways Inc. v. State, 201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd,
280 App. Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); State v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203
N.E.2d 325 (1964).
10 See cases cited note 9 supra.
11 Cal. Const. art. I, § 14.
12 The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution commands that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The measure of
that compensation is usually expressed as the "fair market value" of the property with
due consideration of all its available uses. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942).
The most troublesome problem in establishing compensation is the determination of the
extent of private property which has been taken. One method utilized in making this
determination is to examine the extent to which government property rights detract from
the value which otherwise might be considered part of, or incidental to, the private
property rights. This method is central to the concept of "navigation servitude." Powell,
Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 Wash. L. Rev. 271, 273 (1956).
13 — Cal. App. 2d at —, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
14 — Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 8, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
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bridges downstream, it would be rendered valueless after such construction
in that ships launched would be able to go nowhere. They urged that any
action which renders a right valueless effectively "takes or damages" that
right. Since the court was to find that any rights of access of the plaintiffs,
private or otherwise, were burdened with a servitude and, therefore, non-
compensable, it found it unnecessary to deal with this contention."
The servitude theory relied on by the Col berg court is similar to, though
wider in scope than, the federal servitude theory. As early as 1897, in Gibson
v. United States?"' the Supreme Court stated that riparian ownership is
obliged to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the
exercise of the dominant right of the government in that regard. In more
recent times, this principle has been referred to by the Court as the doctrine
of "navigation servitude."
When the Government exercises this servitude [derived from, but
narrower than, the constitutional power to regulate commerce], it
is exercising its paramount power in the interest of navigation
rather than taking the private property of anyone. The owner's use
of property riparian to a navigable stream long has been limited by
the right of the public to use the stream in the interest of naviga-
tion.... There thus has been ample notice over the years that such
property is subject to a dominant public interest. . . . Accordingly,
it is consistent with the history and reason of the rule to deny com-
pensation where the claimant's private title is burdened with this
servitude but to award compensation where his title is not so
burdened.17
15 Id.
16 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897).
11 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., ,339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950). In another
case the servitude is described in these terms:
The dominant power of the federal Government, as has been repeatedly held,
extends to the entire bed of a stream, which includes the lands below ordinary
high-water mark. The exercise of the power within these limits is not an invasion
of any private property right in such lands for which the United States must
make compensation. The damage sustained results not from a taking of the ri-
parian owner's property in the stream bed, but from the lawful exercise of
a power to which that property has always been subject.
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941).
Since the federal servitude relates to the stream and the stream bed, the burden is
imposed on riparian rights in the use of the stream rather than on the riparian property
itself. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). Lands
riparian to navigable streams are known as "fast lands" and the Supreme Court has
said that compensation must be paid for their taking, notwithstanding the navigation
servitude. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945). How-
ever, since riparian rights may constitute much of the value of fast lands and since just
compensation is determined, at least in part, with reference to the "navigation servitude"
when fast lands are taken, the riparian owner is compensated without consideration for
the value which the property may have as a result of its being riparian to a navigable
stream. A major Supreme Court case in this area was United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). The Government condemned all of the property
of the defendant power company consisting of a dam, locks in and along the navigable
stream and fast lands adjacent thereto. The principal issue before the Court was the
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Gibbons v. Ogden's made it clear that the delegation of the power to
regulate commerce vested the national government with the power to regulate
navigation. It was logical to assume that the protection and maintenance of
navigation was the basis, the measure, and the limit of the regulatory power. 19
Language in the early cases reflected these assumptions as to the limitation
of the congressional power." The appearance of the so-called multipurpose
projects constituted a marked departure from the traditional context of sov-
ereign dealings with navigable waters. 2 ' Although navigation may no longer
be the measure and the limit of the federal power, navigation would seem to
remain, for reasons of history, the basis and the constitutional touchstone
for congressional action. 22
In establishing the power of the State of California over its navigable
waters, the Colberg court asserted that the state holds all of its navigable
waterways and the lands lying beneath them "as trustee of a public trust for
the benefit of the people." 23 The state's power to control, regulate, and
utilize such waters within the terms of the trust was absolute, according to
the court, except as limited by the paramount supervisory power of the fed-
eral government over navigable waters. Until Congress acted on the subject,
the power of the state was plenary. The court did admit, however, that the
nature and extent of the trust under which the state held its navigable water-
valuation of the fast lands. Since the value of the fast lands was dependent upon the
use of the flow of the stream and since this was a use subject to the federal navigation
servitude, compensation for the fast lands was denied. "Mhe Government cannot be
justly required to pay for an element of value which did not inhere in these parcels as
upland." Id. at 76. Recently, other Supreme Court cases have further entrenched the
federal navigation servitude theory. In United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222 (1956), the Supreme Court ruled, five to four, that the United States as condemnor
of riparian land on a navigable river need not pay the owner the value the lands have as
a power dam site, even though the condemnee held the land for that purpose and the
Government took the land to build its own dam. The defendant argued that the land
above the ordinary high-water mark was private land and not burdened with the Gov-
ernment's servitude. The flaw in that reasoning, according to the Court, was that the
landowner sought a value in the flow of the stream, a value that inhered in the Gov-
ernment's servitude and one that the Government could grant or withhold as it chose.
The dominion of the Government over .the water power and not the location of the
land was determinative. The four dissenters in Twin City felt that compensation should
be made on the basis of "fair market value" of the land at the time it was taken, in-
cluding recognition of any fair market value of the land due to its riparian • character.
They conceded that the United States had the power to appropriate the property under
eminent domain, but stated that the servitude was limited to the bed of the stream as
fixed by its ordinary high-water mark. It was felt that the location of the land was always
a factor and when the land condemned was outside the scope of the servitude, that the
Government should be subject to the same rules of compensation as other condemnors.
See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967), in which a unanimous Supreme Court
found the principles of the majority position in Twin City to be controlling. 
18 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Is See 2 Waters and Water Rights 9 (R. Clark ed. 1967). 	 .
20 See, e.g., United. States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S., 411, 418
(1926); United States v.-Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
21 See, e.g:, United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Arizona v.
California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
22 2 Waters and Water Rights, supra note 19, at 11.
23 — Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 8, 62 Cal, Rptr. at 406.
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ways had never been defined with precision. It stated that, generally, "acts
of the state with regard to its navigable waters are within trust purposes when
they are done 'for purposes of commerce, navigation, and fisheries for the
benefit of all the people of the state.' "24 The court concluded that the power
of California to deal with its navigable waters was considerably wider in
scope than the paramount federal power. It held that the state may act
relative to its waterways "in any manner consistent with the inprovement
[sic] of commercial traffic and intercourse." 25 As such the state's power is
not limited to improvement of navigation only.
Having established the state's power over its navigable waterways, the
Colberg court next turned to the compensation aspect of the problem. After
discussing the federal navigation servitude doctrine, the court concluded:
[T] he law of California burdens property riparian or littoral to
navigable waters with a servitude commensurate with the power of
the state over such navigable waters, and that "when the act [of the
state] is done, if it does not embrace the actual taking of property,
but results merely in some injurious effect upon the property, the
property.owner must, for the sake of the general welfare, yield un-
compensated obedience." (Gray v. Reclamation District No. 1500,
... 174 Cal. 622, 636, 163 P. 1024, 1030.) 20 (Emphasis added.)
There is no question but that a state may exercise its governmental power
over navigable waters for the benefit of all the people of the state. The prob-
lem arises, however, when the court extends the servitude doctrine of non-
compensability so that it is "commensurate" with that power. The court
seems to have treated the expansion of the navigation power and the expan-
sion of the range of noncompensable losses as interchangeable questions. 27
Yet, due to the existence of the principles normally used in eminent domain
proceedings, that is by no means a necessary approach. This fact is demon-
strated by the approach to water access cases taken by most other states. In
such highly populated and industrial states as Massachusetts, Ohio, New York
and Illinois, the servitude operates only when the state acts upon its navigable
waters for the purpose of improving navigation, and private rights "damaged"
by acts not in aid of navigation are therefore compensable. 28 The Massachu-
setts court has stated that "the only specific powers which have been ex-
pressly recognized as exercisable without compensation to private parties are
those to regulate and improve navigation and the fisheries." 29 Similarly, the
Ohio court stated that " [w]here the state makes an improvement for a
purpose other than the improvement of navigation, which destroys riparian
24 .Id. at —, 432 P.2d at 9, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
25 Id. at —, 432 P.2d at II, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
26 Id .
27 See 2 Waters and Water Rights, supra note 19, at 50.
28 Beidler v. Sanitary District, 211 III. 628, 71 N.E. 1118 (1904) ; Michaelson v.
Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961) ; Marine Air Ways,
Inc. v. State, 201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd, 280 App. Div. 1021,
116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); State v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
29 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. at 256; 173 N.E.2d at
277.
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rights, the owners of such rights are entitled to compensation for the loss
they have suffered." 3 ° These states recognize the existence and the effect of
the federal navigation servitude but clearly limit its application to projects
in aid of navigation. In other words, the power of the state over riparian
property does not always absolve the state from its duty to compensate
under eminent domain principles.
As the dissent's opinion in Colberg suggests, the choice between use of
the navigation servitude theory and eminent domain principles is essentially
based on public policy. 3 ' Early in the development of the federal and state
governments, the need to improve the nation's waterways was urgent and
this need led to the adoption of the navigation servitude theory. To extend
this navigation servitude to improvements in other areas of commerce, how-
ever, may not be based on sound public policy. Indeed, the courts in Cali-
fornia have developed a policy with respect to land access and air space
cases which is directly counter to that employed in Colberg.
California, with its tremendous influx of population and rapid expansion
of public facilities to serve this growth, has experienced difficulty in protect-
ing the property owner's right of access to the street abutting his property
and, from there, to the general system of streets, while at the same time
restricting the rising costs of needed public improvements. 32 In California,
the abutter's right of access has become a recognized property right, rec-
ognized not only in courtroom decisions but also in legislation. 33 California
case law in this area has followed an evolutionary pattern. In Bacich v. Board
of Control,34
 plaintiff was a homeowner on a street which was intersected at
each end by a through street. As a result of construction of an approach to
the San Francisco Bay Bridge, one of the intersecting streets was lowered
50 feet leaving plaintiff's property on a cul-de-sac. The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for impairment of his right of access
because an owner of property abutting a public street has a property
right in the nature of an easement in the street, and compensation must be
given for an impairment of that right. 35
 The present state of the law is per-
haps best demonstrated by the 1964 case of Breidert v. Southern Pat. Co."
There the plaintiff claimed a substantial impairment of his right of access to
the area street system as a result of the closing of a grade crossing ordered by
the state Public Utilities Commission. The policy which emerged from Breidert
30 State v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d at 13, 203 N.E.2d at 327.
31 — Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
32 Note, California and the Right of Access: The Dilemma Over Compensation, 38
S. Cal. L. Rev. 689, 690-91 (1965).
33 See Cal. Sts. 	 H'ways Code § 100.3 (West 1956). This section provides that
from and after the adoption of a resolution by the California Highway Commission de-
claring any section of state highway to be a freeway, such declaration shall not affect
private property rights of access and any such rights taken or damaged within the mean-
ing of Article 1, § 14 of the State Constitution for such freeway shall be acquired in a
manner provided by law.
34 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
35 Id. at 349-50, 144 P.2d at 823.
30 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1964).
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was that compensation must be paid when the property owner could show
a substantial impairment of his right of access.
We have long recognized that the urban landowner enjoys prop-
erty rights, additional to those which he exercises as a member of
the public, in the street upon which his land abuts. . . . This ease-
ment consists of the right to get into the street upon which the
landowner's property abuts and from there, in a reasonable manner,
to the general system of public streets."
Whether substantial impairment exists is a question for the court to deter-
mine under all the facts of the case. Once this determination has been made,
its extent, for compensation purposes, is then determined by the jury.
The fact that the Breidert case set the policy in the land access area is
well substantiated by subsequent cases. 38 Recently, Smith v. San Diego,"
held that when a legitimate public improvement causes special and peculiar
damage to the abutting property owner, the owner is entitled to compensation
for such damage. The court stated that substantial impairment of the abut-
ting landowner's right of access to the adjoining highway may constitute such
special and peculiar damage. 4 ° It is interesting to note that the compensable
rights associated with land access cases include not only the right to get from
one's land to the street abutting his property but also the right to get from
there to the general system of streets. These two rights are directly analogous
to the right of access and right of navigation, respectively, in the water access
cases. As previously mentioned, however, compensation has been awarded only
in the land access cases.
The policy developed in the land access cases, for determining the right
to compensation where no land is actually taken, could be applied consis-
tently to water access cases such as Co!berg. The situations are strikingly
similar; the major distinction appearing to be the existence, in the water
access cases, of a doctrine developed long ago to meet needs no longer in-
volving the same urgency. Today, sound public policy would seem to require
the application of similar criteria for determining a property owner's right to
compensation whether the impairment was of water or land access. Such
criteria might include: (1) whether the means of access left to the plaintiff
after the alleged impairment were sufficient to serve a reasonable use of the
property; (2) whether many others suffered a similar impairment of their
right of access as a result of the improvement; (3) whether the objectives of
the improvement could be accomplished in a less injurious manner; and (4)
whether, considering the effect on all abutting property owners, it was likely
that the cost of compensating them would unduly restrict the state's freedom
37 Id. at 663, 394 P.2d at 721-22, 39 Cal. Rptr. 905-06.
38 See, e.g., People v. Seheinman, — Cal. App. 2d —, 56 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1967);
People v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp., 245 Cal. App. 2d 309, 53 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1966) ;
People v. Wasserman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 716, 50 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1966); People v. Presley,
239 Cal. App. 2d 309, 48 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1966).
39 — Cal. App. 2d 	 —, 60 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607 (1967) .
90 Id.
777
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to deal with social problems?' The Colberg court, however, summarily and
unconvincingly dismissed the analogy to land access cases. 42
Another area that provides an analogy to the water access cases is that
involving diminution of property value caused by state and federal use of the
air space over private property. The United States Supreme Court, in United
States v. Causby,43 found that frequent low flights of military aircraft over
plaintiff's land caused a diminution in property value. Despite the fact that
there was felt to be a servitude imposed on plaintiff's usable air space, the
Court held that there was a compensable "taking" of property rights." In-
asmuch as the air above a defined level is said to be free of all claims of
private ownership, the analogy to the navigation servitude is not inap-
propriate.
The California District Court of Appeal, in a 1964 case similar on its
facts to Causby, held that since the City of San Diego had authority to
acquire air space through eminent domain, its action constituted a "taking"
arid the city was liable to the plaintiffs for damages.45 The action had been
instituted against a commercial airline corporation to enjoin alleged nuisance
and continuing trespass. The airline was leasing the municipal airport from
the city which operated it. The court found that the airline was absolved of
liability by the liability of the city for the taking of airspace over the plain-
tiffs' property. Adherence to procedure required plaintiffs to proceed against
the city to recover compensation."
In Sneed v. Riverside,47 the court said "all of the decisions previously
cited herein from the United States courts clearly declare that damage to
the value of land caused by navigation within an avigation [sic] easement
41 Note, supra note 32, at 698.
42 We are not persuaded that the analogy between highway access and naviga-
tional access will bear close scrutiny. The right of access to a land highway
derives from the 'land service road' concept, whereby roads are conceived of as
arteries constructed through condemnation of private land for the purpose of
serving other land abutting 'on them, rather than for the purpoSe of serving
public traffic passing over them.... Principles applicable to such a right cannot
reasonably be extended to the case of navigable waterways, whiCh constitute a
- natural resource retained within the public domain for the purpose of serving
public traffic in accordance with the greatest common benefit."
— Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 13, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 411..
43 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
44 Id. at 261-62, 264-66.
45 Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., — Cal. App. 2d 	 —, 37
Cal. Rptr. 253, 259, vacated, 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394.P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964). The
supreme court vacated the court of appeal decision because the plaintiffs had sought
only injunctive relief which, in the court's opinion, was not available. The court noted
that there was no prayer for damages, nor did anything in the complaint indicate in
monetary terms the amount of damages sustained. However, the court stated that
"nothing herein is intended to be a determination of the rights of landowners who suffer
from airplane annoyances to seek . . . compensation from the owner of operator of an
airport." 61 Cal. 2d at .590-91, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714. "Mt is clear, of
course, that state courts have jurisdiction to award compensation for a 'taking' without
regard to whether the overflights conform to federal law, when such relief is appropriate."
Id. at 594, 394 P.2d at 555-56, 39 Cal. Rptr..at . 715-16.
42 - Cal. App. 2d at —, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66.
44 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 210, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1963).
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amounts to a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."" The
court found that when airspace immediately above private property is taken
from the individual, reducing the value of his property, and conferred upon
the public for public use, eminent domain principles are applicable." The
court emphasized the words of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon: so
we are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."
In Col berg, the California Supreme Court stated that " [t]he limits Si the
servitude are reached . . . and just compensation must be paid . . . when
permanent physical encroachment upon or invasion of land riparian to the
navigable waterways ... results." 52 However, when an improvement is under-
taken which impairs the right of access, property has been taken or damaged,
and under the California Constitution, compensation should be awarded.
Requiring the actual appropriation of the "property" does not realistically
take into account the deprivation which may be suffered by one whose land
is physically untouched." This is supported by the existence of the phrase
"or damaged" in Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution. The
fifth amendment merely states "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." One of the main factors that caused many
states to add the words "or damaged" to their constitutions was the recogni-
tion of potential deprivation of property rights short, of actual physical
appropriation.
California imposes a servitude on the right of access to navigable waters,
but not on the right of access to streets or rights in air space. The applica-
tion of the navigation servitude theory to projects in aid of navigation is a
well established historical policy, developed at a time when a large propor-
tion of interstate commerce involved navigation. However, the extension of
this theory to projects not in aid of navigation seems to be, an illogical and
inequitable reliance on outmoded concepts and seems to ignore the fact that
commerce today is much more complex and broader than it was when the
navigation servitude concept originated.
The substantial-impairment test, which is applied in order to determine
the right to compensation in California highway access and air navigation
98 Id. at 210, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
42 While height restriction zoning has long been recognized as a valid exercise of the
police power, there has been a reluctance to extend this method to the protection of
approaches to airports; instead, air easements with payment of compensation appear to
be the more acceptable, although not undisputed, method of protecting approach zones.
Id. at 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
50 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
52 Id. at 416.
52 - Cal. 2d at —, 432 P.2d at 11, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
53 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Hilltop Properties Inc. v.
State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965); Los Angeles Athletic)Club• v.
Long Beach, 128 Cal. App. 427, 17.P.2d 1061 (1932); Note, supra note 32, ;21.690.
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cases, and which was advocated by the dissent in Colberg, provides a just
framework within which considerations of public and private needs can be
balanced. As in land access cases, the policy toward compensation in water
access cases should be formulated in a manner consistent with a concept of
just compensation as one of loss distribution, i.e., several individuals should
not be required to withstand a disproportionate burden of the cost of im-
provements. The Colberg court, while upholding the broad state power with
respect to the use of navigable waters, should have limited application of the
navigation servitude to its historical meaning, i.e., in aid of navigation. The
court could thus have devoted its attention to the accommodation process
between conflicting interests, rather than seek a solution by invoking the
navigation servitude which precludes any effort to articulate relevant policy
considerations.
RUTH R. BTJDD
Income Taxation—Internal Revenue Code of 1954—Sections 162, 337-
Corporate Liquidation—Sale of Capital Assets—Deductibility of Ex-
penses.—Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson. 1—Petitioner corporation incurred brokers'
commissions and accountants' and attorneys' fees in effecting the sale of its
capital assets while undergoing a complete liquidation which qualified for
treatment under Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 2 Under
section 337, no gain or loss was to be recognized on the sale of these capital
assets and, accordingly, the capital gain actually realized on the transaction
did not increase the tax liability of the corporation. On its tax return, peti-
tioner claimed a deduction from ordinary income for the commissions and
fees relating to the sale as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
Section 162 of the Code. 3 The district director disallowed the deduction on
the basis that the expenditures were capital expenses rather than ordinary and
necessary expenses, and were controlled by section 1016 4 rather than section
162. Upon suit for refund, the district court agreed with the taxpayer. On ap-
peal by the Government, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals HELD:
Reversed. Fees incurred in the sale of capital assets pursuant to corporate
1 385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1967).
2 Section 337 states in part:
(a) General Rule.
If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after
June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period begining on the date of the adoption
of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete
liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be
recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property
within such 12-month period.
3 Section 162 states in part that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business ...."
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 [hereinafter cited as 'RC], § 1016 provides in part that
"[p]roper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made—(1) for
expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to capital account ...."
780
